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BRUBAKER WAIVED CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS 
REQUIRING JEX TO VERIFY THAT 
ELECTRICAL AND PLUMBING HAD BEEN 
PROPERLY TIED OR CAPPED OFF 
The Trial Court concluded, as a matter of law, that Brubaker's 
assurance that "everything is taken care of" in response to Jex's 
inquiry whether utilities had been tied off or capped off was 
insufficient to waive contractual provisions requiring Jex to 
verify that all work to be removed, electrical has been completely 
shut-off, and any piping, conduit, etc., is tied off or capped off. 
(Conclusion of Law 1 of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, dated 
November 27, 1995). Brubaker argues that the Court's finding of 
waiver is not a legal conclusion, but actually a finding of fact. 
The Court's finding of non-waiver is clearly a legal 
conclusion. First, it is set forth in the Court's Conclusions of 
Law. Second, waiver or non-waiver is a legal doctrine which the 
Court may or may not apply. Here, the Court apparently has 
misunderstood or misapplied the law of waiver and, therefore, 
reached an erroneous legal conclusion. Therefore, the standard for 
review is as previously stated by Jex. That is, the Court should 
give no particular deference to the Conclusions of the Trial Court 
below, but review them for correctness. Savage v. Educators Ins. 
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Co, , 908 P.2d 862 (Utah App. 1995), Anesthesiologists Assoc, v. St. 
Benedicts Hosp. . 884 P.2d 1236, 1238 (Utah 1994). 
Brubaker argues that the requirement to verify that utilities 
are tied off or capped off, as a matter of law, requires an 
independent verification by Jex that the work was completed. 
Brubaker further argues that Brubaker did not waive Jex's duty to 
independently verify whether plumbing and electrical had been tied 
and capped off when its superintendent told Jex that everything had 
been taken care of. 
The parties agree that, as set forth in Soter's, Inc. v. 
Deseret Federal Sav. & Loan. 857 P.2d 935, 939-940 (Utah 1993) 
(citations omitted), "waiver requires three elements: (1) an 
existing right, benefit, or advantage; (2) knowledge of its 
existence; and (3) an intention to relinquish the right." 
Here, a contract existed which Brubaker claims imposed a duty 
upon Jex to perform an independent investigation concerning whether 
the plumbing and electrical had been capped and tied off. In 
relation to the second element, Brubaker clearly knew of the 
existence of the contract since it drafted the contract. In 
relation to the third requirement, that is, an intention to 
relinquish the right, the undisputed facts are that prior to 
starting to work, Jex asked Brubaker's superintendent whether the 
electrical service, the gas service, the plumbing and other utility 
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services had been disconnected, Brubaker's superintendent told Jex 
that everything was taken care of and gave him the go ahead to 
start work (Trial transcript, page 67, lines 15-25; page 72, line 
17 through page 74, line 18; and page 81, line 7 through page 82, 
line 2). 
By making this statement, Brubaker's superintendent clearly 
waived any requirement that Jex make an independent inspection or 
verification concerning the utility lines. The question Jex posed 
Brubaker's superintendent was for the clear purpose of determining 
of whether utility lines had been capped off. Jex was trying to 
determine whether the work-site was in an appropriate condition to 
commence demolition. The answer Jex received from Brubaker's 
superintendent was unequivocal, everything was ready for demolition 
to proceed. At the time Brubaker/s superintendent made that 
statement to Jex, Brubaker waived any obligation that Jex may have 
had to independently verify whether or not utilities had been tied 
or capped off. See also. B.R. Woodward Marketing v. Collins Food. 
754 P.2d 99 (Utah App. 1988). 
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SECOND ARGUMENT 
BRUBAKER IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING 
DAMAGES AGAINST JEX BASED ON 
JEX'S RELIANCE ON BRUBAKER'S STATEMENT 
THAT THE ELECTRICAL AND PLUMBING HAD BEEN 
PROPERLY TIED AND CAPPED OFF 
Brubaker argues that the Court's failure to find estoppel is 
not a legal conclusion, but actually a finding of fact. The 
Court's failure to find that the doctrine of estoppel did not apply 
is clearly a legal conclusion. The doctrine of estoppel, or non-
estoppel, is a legal doctrine which the Court may or may not apply. 
Here, Jex asserts that the Court reached an erroneous legal 
conclusion by failing to apply the doctrine of estoppel. 
Therefore, the standard for review is as previously stated. That 
is, the Appellate Court should give no particular deference to the 
conclusions of the Trial Court below, but review them for 
correctness. Savage v. Educators Ins. Co., 908 P.2d 862 (Utah App. 
1995); Anesthesiologists Assoc, v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 884 P.2d 
1236, 1238 (Utah 1994). 
Brubaker argues that even though its superintendent told Jex 
that the plumbing and electrical were properly tied off, Jex still 
had a duty to make an independent investigation of the plumbing and 
electrical systems. 
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The statement of Brubaker's superintendent was broad enough to 
induce Jex to begin work. Had the superintendent said "as far as 
I know, everything is ready for you to commence your work, but you 
shouldn't start until you make the independent investigation 
required under your contract" Brubaker would have an argument. 
Brubaker's superintendent did not say that. When asked if the 
utilities were tied off, Brubaker's superintendent told Jex that 
they were. Because Darrel Jex was not a plumber or an electrician, 
he reasonably relied upon Brubaker's superintendent. The purpose 
of the Doctrine of Estoppel is to prevent one party from leading 
another down the primrose path and then subsequently changing their 
position. 
See Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah App. 1988); 
Grover v. Garn, 464 P.2d 598 (Utah, 1970); J.P. Koch, Inc. v. J.C. 
Penney Co.. Inc.. 534 P.2d 903, 904 (Utah 1975); Celebrity Club, 
Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control, 602 P.2d 689 (Utah, 1979); Brixen & 
Christopher, Arch, v. Elton, 777 P.2d 1039 (Utah App. 1989); 
Blackhurst v. Transamerica Ins. Co.. 699 P.2d 688 (Utah 1985). 
Brubaker has generally asserted that these cases do not apply to 
the facts of this case, but has not distinguished any of these 
cases on their facts. 
Here, Brubaker induced Jex to commence work by representing 
the utilities were tied off. Jex reasonably relied upon those 
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representations to commence his work and now Brubaker may not 
change its position and claim damages against Jex because the 
utilities were not properly tied off, contrary to Brubaker's 
representation. 
THIRD ARGUMENT 
BRUBAKER IS NOT ENTITLED TO DELAY 
DAMAGES FOR THOSE PERIODS OF DELAY 
CAUSED BY IT. 
In its Brief, on pages 17 and 18, Brubaker states "Brubaker's 
claim [sic] damages were a result of needed repairs to damaged 
electrical wires, conduit, pipe and racks, as well as Jex's refusal 
to saw cut certain concrete extension walls, the delay damages were 
not based on delaying others on the job, rather on creating extra 
work to be completed." 
If this Court determines that Jex is not responsible for 
damages to the electrical system because Brubaker waived 
independent verification by Jex or is estopped from asserting that 
Jex was required to make an independent inspection, then Brubaker 
is not entitled to any damages relating to delay to repair the 
electrical system. 
Brubaker is, in fact, responsible for the ten day delay for 
asbestos removal. Brubaker was the general contractor. Jex was 
the subcontractor. Jex was not responsible for asbestos removal; 
however, Brubaker was. Brubaker was required to provide access to 
the site to Jex so that Jex could perform his work. Brubaker 
failed to provide access and Jex was delayed for ten days. Higcrins 
v. City of Fillmore, 639 P.2d 192 (Utah, 1981), Western Engineers, 
Inc. v. State Road Commission, 20 Utah 2.d 294, 437 P.2d 216 
(1968); and Weyher Construction Co. v. Cox Construction Co. , 22 
Utah 2.d 365, 453 P.2d 161 (1969), all clearly apply. Jex could 
not commence work because Brubaker had not prepared the site for 
him to do so. 
FOURTH ARGUMENT 
BRUBAKER WAIVED DELAY DAMAGES THROUGH 
ITS COURSE OF DEALING WITH JEX. 
Brubaker argues that Jex makes its argument concerning waiver 
of delay damages based on the facts presented at trial. To the 
contrary, Jex makes its argument based on B.R. Woodward Marketing 
v. Collins Food, 754 P.2d 99 (Utah App. 1988) and points the Court 
to undisputed facts presented at trial in support of its argument. 
Brubaker has failed to cite the Court any facts which dispute those 
presented by Jex. 
Jex has attempted to fairly present the facts to the Court 
relating to the issues raised. Given the fact that Brubaker failed 
7 
to make any claim for delay damages until after Jex asserted a 
claim for the balance due him under the contract, and previously 
submitted a change order which did not include any claim for delay 
damages, although the amount of such damages should have been 
determined by that date, Brubaker has waived its claim for delay 
damages. 
CONCLUSION 
On each of its points Jex asks this Court to review the legal 
conclusions of the court below without any deference, but for 
correctness. The Court concluded, as a matter of law, that 
Brubaker's on-site superintendent's assurance that "everything is 
taken care of" in response to whether utilities had been tied off 
i 
was insufficient to waive or limit Jex's performance pursuant to 
the plans and specifications which require the 
subcontractor/defendant to "verify that all work to be removed, 
electrical has been completely shut off, and any piping, conduit, 
etc., is tied off or capped of." The Court, as a matter of law, 
determined that verification meant an independent inspection. Jex 
asserts he, in fact, verified that the utilities had been capped 
and tied off by asking Brubaker's superintendent. Brubaker waived 
any further requirement for independent inspection when, in 
response to Jex's inquiry, its superintendent told him everything 
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was taken care of and that he could proceed. Brubaker is further 
estopped from telling Jex that the electrical was capped off and 
then subsequently changing his position and claiming damages 
because the electrical was not capped off. 
Jex is not liable for delay damages caused by Brubaker, nor 
for any delay damages which resulted from repair of the electrical 
system which was damaged through no fault of Jex but because 
Brubaker had mislead him concerning the electrical had been tied 
off. 
Based on the foregoing and on Jex's initial Trial Brief, Jex 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the judgment entered 
by the Trial Court with directions to the Trial Court to enter 
judgment in favor of Jex in the amount of $18,440.00, less 
$3,328.00 being the back charge for remedial wall repair and cement 
cutting at the Northeast corner of the existing building, or 
$15,512.00. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this D\T day of August, 1996. 
ASHTON, BRAUNBERGER, BOUD 
& WILDE, P.C. 
Wayne H./ Braunberger 0 
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